B. How can we explain magnitude of volatility?
• Change in physical state variables small • No destruction as in war or natural disaster • Yet huge changes in behavior • Shocks seem to have been amplified, rather than "buffered," as suggested by traditional economic models
• Price adjustments and inventories 6 C. How do we explain persistence?
• Losses in GDP after crisis greater than those associated with misallocation of resources before crisis
• Same real assets (physical, human, natural capital) after crisis as before
• Even debt shouldn't matter: standard General Equilibrium theory says that there is a market clearing competitive equilibrium
• More than just a sunspot equilibrium
• Key question is what is source of persistence
• Not in K or labor supply
• Answering these questions is important to know appropriate policy response
• Explaining unemployment is key
• Not (or not just) ZLB • Also critical to understand what gave rise to ZLB problem (i.e. why at zero nominal interest rate there is a deficiency in aggregate demand)
• Liquidity in hands of those who don't want to consume/spend
• If decrease in hours worked were evenly shared and there were full intertemporal and interstate smoothing, social cost of economic fluctuations would be much less • Although there were often a few who made some money by exploiting seeming irrationality of others • But these did not suffice to prevent the creation of a major bubble • This is more than just a statement that crisis was not "expected"
• Design of mortgages did not represent "rational" and efficient system of risk sharing
• Greenspan's encouragement of variable rate mortgages
• Was it conceivable that housing prices/real estate prices could continue to grow?
• Limits on spending on housing • Unlimited supply of land in Nevada desert
• If, of course, crisis had been widely expected (at some earlier date), then consumption would have fallen at that earlier date
Financial sector is critical
• Not just T-bill rate or money supply • Lending rate and credit availability
• "Liquidity"-access to funds-can dry up • Term has no meaning in "standard" models
• Credit to SME's linked to banking system
• SME lending linked to regional banks (local informaiton) • Credit creation
• Credit can be created out of "thin" air
• Unlike seeds
• Still, one needs to explain supply of credit (e.g. through banking system)
• With aggregate demand depending on credit availability, changes in credit availability can have macroeconomic consequences
• Adjustments in prices do not instantaneously offset • No presumption that the market supply of credit will ensure aggregate demand equaling aggregate supply
• A key function of monetary policy is to provide the requisite coordination A credit economy is based on trust
• Trust that the "money" that is borrowed will be repaid • Trust that the money that is received will be honored by others.
• If a financial institution is trusted, it can create "money" ("credit") on its own, issuing IOU's that will be honored by others
• Can thereby increase effective demand • But in many countries (e.g. US) the problem is not an insufficiency of consumption, but of investment, and broad based money rain would restore full employment by encouraging consumption
